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Summary!
This investigation aims to explore the usability and shortcomings of Buzan and Wævers 
securitization theory in explaining the coup d’etat against Manuel Zelaya in Honduras in 2009.!
With an outset in the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions report about the coup and an article 
from Honduran newspaper La Prensa, I investigate how and by whom the coup against Zelaya 
was sought legitimized. !
Using the concepts of the securitization theory I identify securitizing actors and securitizing speech 
acts performed against Zelaya. I further investigate internal and external facilitating conditions that 
might have helped the securitizing moved gain acceptance by an audience. Among these I find it 
an external facilitating condition that the primary securitizing actors are all representatives of 
different institutions of the Honduran state, namely the congress and the juridical institutions, and 
thereby hold a privileged power position.!
Another external facilitating condition I find to be the nature of the alleged threat, which is that 
Zelaya will stay in power, and thereby threaten democracy. I find it a facilitating condition that 
Honduras has earlier experiences of dictatorships and that leftwing presidents in other Latin 
American countries has within the last decade changed constitutions and thereby gained to stay in 
power. These factors might have helped make the alleged threat appear realistic and thereby 
gaining acceptance from some audience. !
Investigating the level of acceptance by different groups of audiences, I find that large parts of the 
Honduran population did not accept the securitizing moves against Zelaya, as well as the first 
reactions of the international society was to condemn the coup. Nevertheless a critical amount of 
countries ended up recognizing the November 2009 elections and thereby admitting some kind of 
legitimacy to the post coup de facto government, which ended up staying in power until the 
elections.!
I end up concluding that the securitization theory offers important tools for understanding how the 
coup in Honduras could come about, by identifying securitizing actors, securitizing speech acts 
and facilitating conditions. I find though that an importing shortcoming of the theory is its lack of 
analytical tools to investigate the power positions held by different groups of audiences, and the 
importance of these power positions for weather or not the securitizing move will become a 
successful securitization. !!!!!!!!
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Chapter 1: Introduction!
In the early morning of the 28th of june 2009 the president of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya 
was captured from his home by the armed forces, and sent on a plane to Costa Rica. The 
political crisis leading up to this event had been going on for months in the little Central 
American country evolving around the presidents wish to make a fourth ballot on whether 
or not to create a new constituent assembly. In the beginning of 2009 Zelaya had called for 
a cuarta urna (fourth ballot) on whether or not the people wanted a constituyente 
(constituent assembly). The original idea was that the fourth ballot should take place 
together with the general elections in november the same year, but the conservative party 
and the conservative powers in the liberal party blocked the proposal from advancing in 
the congress. In response Zelaya organized a non-binding national poll to measure 
whether or not the people were in favour of the fourth ballot. But at the 28th of june 2009, 
the day the poll was supposed to take place, Zelaya was kidnapped by the military and the 
poll was blocked (Main: 13-14).!
! Central America and Latin America more broadly has a history where military and 
armed forces has been highly involved in political affairs, and various countries have 
experienced military coups against democratically elected presidents. Honduras is not an 
exception. The country experienced eight overthrows of political leaders by the use of 
armed forces throughout the nineteenth century and four in the twentieth century. But 
since the last military dictatorship ended in 1982, the country has officially been ruled by 
representative democracy (Yoder et al, 2012: 38). Like in the case of Honduras, the cases 
of military coups throughout the rest of the region has been decreasing the last two 
decades, and since 1992 only one other coup has taken place in Latin America (Gordon 
and Webber: 17). !
Thus political leaders from Latin America and throughout the rest of the world were 
shocked by the escalation of the Honduran conflict into a coup d’etat. The international 
society were in general fast in their condemnation of the coup and the following de facto 
government leaded by the former president of congress and member of Zelayas own 
liberal party, Roberto Micheletti (Barillas et al: 243). !
The coup and the following de facto government did also meet large protests by huge 
parts of the Honduran people, and the day after the coup a new social movement emerged 
under the name Frente Nacional de Recistencia Popular  (the National Front of Popular 
Resistance - FNRP), or La Resistencia (The Resistance). !
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Despite of the immediate condemnation from major parts of the formal international society 
and the large protests of the Honduran people, the coup government did not step back, 
and Zelaya was never reinstalled. In stead the Micheletti government ended up staying in 
power until the following elections in November 2009, whereafter the official winner of the 
election, the conservative Porfirio Lobo, took over presidency (Ibid: 211). !
According to the military who conducted the coup they did so in order to protect the 
Honduran democracy and the rule of law, since they were afraid that Zelaya’s real 
intention with the fourth ballot was to stay in power. !
Seen from outside though I find it difficult to understand how a forced removal of a 
democratically elected president can be claimed an action protecting democracy. How 
could this action take place at all? How was it legitimized? And how did the coup 
government succeed in staying in power until the following elections, despide of attempt of 
international pressure? !
!
A theory developed within the so called Copenhagen School of security studies suggests 
that the use of extraordinary measures within politics is often legitimized through 
securitization - an intersubjective process that  places an issue within the field of security, 
by claiming something an existential threat that needs to be handled differently than other 
political issues. The theory is developed to describe such processes taking place in 
western liberal democracies (Buzan and Wæver: 24). Honduras differs though from a well 
functioning western liberal democracy in significant aspects, e.g. lack of autonomy in 
democratic institutions, high levels of corruption and impunity and extremely high levels of 
violence and criminality (Jacobsen: 10). I find it interesting to investigate the usability and 
shortcomings of the securitization theory in explaining the coup in Honduras, and my 
investigation will thus take its point of departure in the following research question.!
!
1.1: Research question:!
How can Buzan and Wævers securitization theory help to explain the Coup d’etat in 
Honduras in 2009 and what are the shortcomings of the theory in explaining this? !
!
!
!
!
!
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1.2: Clarification of research question:!
Securitization theory: !
With securitization theory I refer to the theoretical framework developed by Ole Wæver 
and Barry Buzan primarily in their book “Security - A new framework for analysis”. Main 
points from their theory, that I find relevant for the analysis, will be introduced in chapter 3. !
!
The Coup d’etat in Honduras in 2009:!
With the Coup d’etat in Honduras 2009 I refer both to the specific event where the military 
removed Zelaya by force from the country and thereby removed him from his place as 
president of the republic. I furthermore consider the following period ruled by the de facto 
government that was inserted after this specific event as part of the coup. Thus I aim to 
investigate the securitization theory’s applicability in explaining both how the specific event 
of removing Zelaya by force could take place, but also how it was possible for the following 
de facto government to stay in power as long as they did. !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 2: Methodology!!
2.1 Case study!
In line with other researchers, such as for instance Bent Flyvberg, I have chosen to make 
a case study. Flyvberg (2010: 473) argue that case studies are suitable as examples that 
can strengthen our understanding of the quality of social phenomenas and to some extend 
relations between these phenomenas. Flyvberg suggests a variety of criteria from which 
you can chose your case. I have chosen my case from the criterion that Flyvberg 
describes as a so called extreme case, which has the aim of generating knowledge about 
specific unusual or extreme conditions, that can be either specifically successful or 
problematic (ibid: 475). !
Thus I have chosen to investigate the coup d’etat in Honduras since I find it a special or 
extreme case of violation of the basic rules of democracy. From an analytic view I find it a 
case of a specifically successful violation of these rules, in the sense that the coup 
succeeded and the following de facto government succeeded in staying in power 
afterwards. From a normative view, based on the basic principles of representative 
democracy, on the other hand I find that specifically problematic, which is part of my 
motivation for investigating, how this “success” could come about. !
Flyvberg further writes that a common misunderstanding is that case studies are only 
suitable for generating hypotheses that can then be tested with quantitative methods. 
Opposing this he argues that case studies can be used for both hypotheses generation 
and testing. The critical point is which case you chose and what you try to investigate with 
the use of the case (Ibid: 469). !
Taking my outset in the securitization theory formulated by Buzan and Wæver, my 
investigation has more the character of hypothesis testing than of hypothesis generating. !
The securitization theory has been applied to a variety of cases that goes well under the 
characteristics of western liberal democracy, for which the theory was developed. This has 
been done both by Buzan and Wæver, but also by other researchers, such as Huysmans 
(2000), Williams (2003) or Roe (2004) which has helped to further develop the theoretical 
framework for analysis of these specific kinds of cases. I find it interesting though to 
investigate to which extend the theory is applicable on other types of cases, that do not fit 
into the characteristics of a western liberal democracy, in order to better understand how 
the use of extraordinary measures can be possible and/or legitimized in such other 
contexts. !
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Thus I have chosen to investigate the coup in Honduras since I see it as a case of what 
Buzan and Wæver describes as a violation of the rules of normal politics, or a use of an 
extraordinary measure. My aim is thus to investigate the applicability of the theory on this 
specific case, in order to better understand the usability and shortcomings of the theory, 
and ideally to produce new knowledge that can give nuances to the theoretical framework, 
and it’s applicability on cases that has similar characteristics as that of Honduras. !
My investigation thus takes its outset in the following hypotheses:!
!
2.2: Hypotheses!
1) The coup d’etat in Honduras was sought legitimized by securitizing speech acts.!
2) The specific Honduran context differs significantly from the western liberal democracies 
that securitization theory is developed to describe, and therefore other factors might have 
importance than those suggested by Buzan and Wæver. !
!
2.3: Selection, usage and validity of empirical data!
2.3.1: Article from La Prensa: “Honduras: La ruta Ilegal de la Cuarta Urna”!
In order to find out how the coup in Honduras was sought legitimized in the country I have 
searched in the net archives of major Honduran newspapers. I have searched on the 
following words: Zelaya 2009, cuarta urna, consulta popular, constituyente, golpe de 
estado. (Zelaya 2009, fourth ballot, popular referendum/poll, constituting assembly, coup 
d’etat)!
By this search I have found different articles concerning the political conflict between 
Zelaya and the congress, that led up to the coup. I have found that especially one article 
(Mendez: 2009) gave a detailed description of the development of the conflict from 
february 2009 to the 27th of june 2009, the day before the coup took place and the day the 
article was published. I have used this article as main source for identifying the critics 
directed at Zelaya, which led up to the coup, to hereafter analyze if the arguments used 
can be described as securitizing speech acts. !
Thus I have first extracted all quotes from the article and organized them after which actor 
was quoted. I have then categorized the quotes after the following categories of actors: 
members of congress and the political parties, representatives of juridical institutions, 
representatives of the armed forces, representatives of churches, representatives of civil 
society.!
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I then analyzed the quotes as speech acts following Buzan and Wævers descriptions of 
what defines a securitizing speech act. I found that some quotes could not be defined as 
securitizing speech acts, while some others could. I have then chosen the quotes that i 
think can be defined as securitizing speech acts, and further used them as examples in my 
analysis. !
!
La Prensa is as mentioned one of the major Honduran news papers. The major news 
papers in Honduras are all owned by six families, who all own other companies in the 
country, and are part of the economic elite. The economic elite of the country has 
traditionally got strong relations to the two traditional parties, Partido Liberal and Partido 
Nacional. As such the major news papers, including La Prensa, can not be used as neutral 
informers of political life, and generally the major media concerns favoured the critics of 
Zelaya in their coverage of the events revolving around the coup (Barillas et al: 216). The 
article from La Prensa is also a clearly biased framing of the conflict, which is revealed 
already when reading the headline, which claims Zelaya’s fourth ballot illegal. The 
important thing for my investigation is though not if the article gives an “objective” or 
representative description of the conflict, since my purpose is not to investigate whether or 
not the fourth ballot was a threat to the Honduran democracy. My purpose is to investigate 
which arguments were used against Zelaya and the fourth ballot and by which actors they 
were used. For that purpose I find the article suitable and valid, since the article is itself 
one long argument against the fourth ballot referring to arguments performed by a variety 
of actors.!
2.3.2: Report from the truth and reconciliation commission: “Para que los 
hechos no se repitan”!
Buzan and Wæver emphasizes the significance of social power between the securitizing 
actor and it’s audience. In order to investigate the power position held by the securitizing 
actors as well as the reactions of their audience I have searched for information about 
power structures in Honduran society and about the events taking place before, during 
and after the coup. I have searched on scholar.google.com as well as article data bases 
such as SocINDEX, Worldwide Political Science   and Sociological Abstracts.!
I have found the 547 page long report of the truth and reconciliation commission (Barillas 
et al: 2011) to be the most detailed investigation and description of the political 
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development revolving around the coup, and have therefore used this report as the 
primary empirical source for this part of the analysis. !
I have especially used informations from chapter 8 “Los actores institucionales y 
sociopolitical en los hechos del 28 de junio de 2009” (The institutional and sociopolitical 
actors involved in the events of the 28th of June 2009) and chapter 10 “El ámbito 
internacional de la crisis” (The international scope of the crisis) in order to investigate the 
power relations between the securitizing actors and it’s audiences, as well as the reactions 
of the audiences, here under actors of the international society. !
!
Besides from being an in depth investigation of the events, processes and power 
structures that formed part of the coup in Honduras 2009, the report is, of course, a 
political product. !
The idea of creating a truth and reconciliation commission was initially established as part 
of the negotiations between Zelaya and Micheletti under the assistance of representatives 
of the international society. The negotiations though broke down and the parts in the 
conflict did never meet any agreement or reconciliation. Thus the official ending of the 
conflict became instead the November 2009 elections, where Porfirio Lobo was elected as 
president. The truth and reconciliation commission was thus created under the Lobo 
government, and the fact that it is called a truth and reconciliation commission, implies 
somehow that there was a reconciliation.  !
A great part of the population did not recognize the November 2009 elections as the 
ending of the conflict though and chose therefore to boycott the elections, and thereby 
refuse to recognize Lobo as legitimate president. Likewise a great part of the population 
did not recognize the mandate of the truth and reconciliation commission, as well as 
Zelaya and his representatives didn’t. Therefore an association of human rights 
organizations La Plataforma de Derechos Humanos (the Platform for Human Rights), 
created a new commission to investigate the events related to the conflict about the coup. 
This new commission was called La commission de verdad (the truth commission) and !
in their report the commission emphasizes that their work has been carried out in a context 
of a still ongoing conflict, while they aim to tell the “truth” about the conflict, from the 
perspective of the victims, namely the members of FNRP and La Resistencia (Yoder et al: 
30-33). !
!
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Thus both commissions are political, as well as both reports represent a political view on 
the conflict. Nevertheless I have chosen to use the report of the truth and reconciliation 
commission as my primary empirical source about the coup, knowing that it has a political 
character. I have chosen this simply because I after having read in both reports find the 
one elaborated by the truth and reconciliation commission most well documented and 
detailed. To validate the information I have used from the truth and reconciliations 
commissions report I have read in the truth commissions report to see if these informations 
were contested.!
!!
2.4: Translations!
All quotes from sources written in Spanish (such as the to imperial sources described 
above) are translated by myself. I have tried to reach so accurate a translation as possible, 
but I do acknowledge that meanings can change in the translation from one language to 
another, especially when neither english or spanish is my mother tongue. These 
translations should thus be read with some reservation, and I do encourage spanish 
speaking readers to find the empirical sources themselves if in doubt of wether the 
translation is correct or not. !
!
2.5: List of abbreviations!!
• !ALBA: Alianza Bolivariana para América (The Bolivarian Aliance for America)!!
• EU: European Union!!
• Group of Rio: International organization of some South American and Caribbean states 
(Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and venezuela)!!
• MERCOSUR: El Mercado Común del Sur (The Common Marcet of the South)!!
• OAS: Organization of American States!!
• SICA Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (Central American Integration System)!!
• UNASUR: Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations)!!
• UN:  United Nations!!
• USA: United States of America!!
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Chapter 3: Theory!!
3.1: Securitization - security as speech act and intersubjectivity!
! In line with traditional military security studies Buzan and Wæver defines security as 
the politics of existential threats. However by broadening out what can be defined as an 
existential threat, they take a wider perspective than traditional security studies, allowing 
security studies to focus on a variety of sectors and not only the state and military. (Buzan 
and Wæver: 21)!
According to Buzan and Wæver existential threats can only be understood in relation to 
the referent object in question. Opposing the realist assumptions within traditional security 
studies they state that there is no universal standard for what can be seen as an 
existential threat, thus security can not be understood in terms of objectivity. It is neither 
politically nor analytically helpful to try to define if a threat is real or not. Instead security 
analysis should be about understanding the processes and practices through which 
security is constructed (Ibid: 24).! !
! Buzan and Wæver perceive security as an intersubjective establishment of an 
existential threat constructed through speech acts, and they call this process 
securitization. Securitization is the process that takes an issue out of normal politics and 
the established rules of political life, legitimizing the use of extraordinary measures and the 
violation of rules that would otherwise have to be followed.!
 An actor can try to legitimize the use of extraordinary measures by claiming something an 
existential threat. This is by Buzan and Wæver defined as a securitizing move. But in order 
for it to be a successful securitization, the claim has to be accepted by an audience, to a 
such extend that it would be possible to use extraordinary measures. Thus securitization is 
an intersubjective process (Ibid: 25). !
! In a democracy it has to be argued at some point why an issue is seen as a security 
issue and therefore has to be handled differently. However in some cases securitization is 
institutionalized, and it is no longer needed to legitimize extraordinary measures - it is 
implicitly understood that when we talk of these issues it is a matter of security. This is 
often the case with defense and military issues as well as with secret services. In some 
cases issues are securitized to a such extend that they are removed from public influence 
at all, leading to so-called “black security boxes” allowing some issues and parts of the 
budget to be held secret. !
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In well-developed states armed forces and intelligence services are separated from normal 
political life. However in weak states and states in war, where such separation do not fully 
exist, much of normal politics is often securitized, and thereby removed from the ordinary 
political sphere. (Ibid: 28)!
!
3.2: Units of security analysis: Actors and referent objects!
According to Buzan and Wæver 3 types of units are important for analyzing securitization 
processes: !
1) Refererent objects!
2) Securitizing actors!
3) Functional actors!
The referent object is the thing or unit that is seen or claimed to be existentially threatened 
and to have a legitimate claim of survival. Referent objects can be of different scale: At one 
end of the scale is the individual level and at the other end the system level. According to 
Buzan and Wæver the most successful referent objects for securitization seems to be at 
the middle level - such as states, nations and civilizations.!
Traditionally in security studies the referent object is the state or the nation. Buzan and 
Wæver stresses though that referent object can be other kinds of units, but recognizes 
states and nations as privileged referent objects. (Ibid: 36)!
The securitizing actor is the person or group who performs the securitizing move or the 
securitizing speech act. These are typically political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, 
lobbyists or pressure groups. Buzan and Wæver emphasizes the importance of 
distinguishing between speaker and actor, stating that the actor is not necessarily an 
individual person, but is often representing a unit. In order to identify the actor they advise 
analysts to look at how other actors interpret the speaking actor, and to look at the logic 
behind the speech act.!
In most cases the securitizing actor will not be the same as the referent object. In the case 
of the state though there is often a convergence between the securitizing actor and 
referent object, since there are more clear structures for who can represent the state, 
namely the government. It is, so to say, the state speaking with reference to the survival of 
the state. (Ibid: 40-41)!
Functional actors are actors who affect the dynamics of a sector, without being the referent 
object or the actor calling for security on behalf of a referent object. (Ibid: 36)!
!
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!
3.3: Social power and facilitating conditions!
Buzan and Wæver emphasize that in principle all sectors and actors can be relevant for 
security analysis, but they acknowledge that the field is biased. Some actors hold positions 
that are more powerful in relation to defining security. But power is never absolute: No one 
is guarantied the possibility to make people accept a claim, nor is anyone excluded from 
attempts to make alternative representations of security. Therefore the actors of 
securitization cannot be the fixed point of analysis, but the practice of securitization must 
be so. Yet it is important to be specific about who is more or less privileged in articulating 
security and in doing so some facilitating conditions has to be considered.!
Buzan and Wæver defines two categories of facilitating conditions under which securitizing 
speech acts will work:!
1) Internal facilitating conditions concern the speech act itself: it has to follow the grammar 
of securitization rhetorics, with a plot build on an existential threat, a point of no return 
and a suggested way out. !
2) External facilitating conditions concern two aspects: The first is the relation between the 
securitizing actor and the audience, that is the authority or position held by the 
securitizing actor, which affects the likelihood of the audience accepting the speech act. 
The other one concerns the nature of the alleged threat, that either facilitate or impede 
securitization. (Ibid: 31-33)!
!
3.4: Desecuritization!
Buzan and Wæver compare securitization with the process of politicization: Politicization is 
to take an issue out of the private sphere and present it as a public and political matter - as 
for instance seen with the feminist movement claiming that “the private is political”. In this 
sense securitization can be seen as an extreme version of politicization, making an issue 
not only appear as a political matter requiring public attention, but as something requiring 
first priority. On the other hand politicization is to make something appear open and as a 
matter of choice. In this sense securitization can be seen as an opposite movement, 
presenting something as so important that it should not be subject to the normal political 
process (Ibid: 29).!
For Buzan and Wæver securitization should be seen as a failure to deal with an issue as 
normal politics, and they warn political actors as well as analysts to securitize issues, 
without considering  side effects. Instead they see desecuritization as the ideal, which is to 
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move issues out of the threat-defense logic and into the normal political sphere (Ibid: 29). 
However as analysed by Paul Roe Buzan and Wæver do not give very detailed 
descriptions of strategies for desecuritization (Roe: 283).  !
!
3.5: Operationalization of theory!
In order to investigate the applicability of the theory on the Honduran context and the case 
of the coup d’etat in 2009 I will start by investigating what can be characterized as the 
rules of normal politics in Honduras and how the coup d’etat breaks with these. Hereafter I 
will investigate whether or not the coup was a result of a securitization process, by 
analyzing the case with Buzan and Wæver’s concepts. Thus I will start by identifying 
speech acts and actors arguing against Zelaya. Hereafter I will investigate wether or not 
the speech acts follows the grammar of securitization rhetorics, and if so who can be seen 
as securitizing actors. I will further investigate what is claimed to be an existential threat in 
relation to which referent object(s), what is claimed as the point of no return and what is 
suggested as the way out of the threatening situation. I will further investigate the nature of 
the alleged threat, the social power position held by the securitizing actors, and weather or 
not the securitizing moves gained acceptance by any audiences. Lastly I will investigate 
how this securitization impinged on the security on others and how it is interconnected to 
other securitizations. !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 4: Military involvement in politics in Honduras!
As described in the introduction the political history of the country has been largely 
affected by military involvement, and the country has experienced a large amount of 
military coups and following periods of dictatorships. The last of these dictatorships 
officially ended in 1882, with the reintroduction of presidential and parliamentary elections. 
Although the country has officially been ruled by electoral democracy since then the 
following period of the 1980s was largely affected by militarization and political violence. 
During the cold war Honduras played a specifically central role for USA, as military 
platform for counterinsurgency operations against the guerrilla movements in the 
neighboring countries, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala (Gordon and Webber: 22). !
Although Honduras did not experience a full intensity civil war, and did not have a major 
guerrilla movement, as the neighboring countries, the regional context of cold war affected 
largely domestic affairs, and throughout the 1980s the military was used for targeting 
students, unionists, peasant movements and anyone else who belonged to parties or 
movements who were considered leftist (Ibid: 23). !
Throughout the 1990s civil wars in the region ended, peace agreements where signed and 
democracy was officially (re)established, but the level of violence did not decrease. Some 
analysts has argued that the character of violence changed from political violence 
exercised by states or armed groups in order to gain or maintain power, to criminal 
violence exercised by different civil actors in order to obtain goods (Castillanos: 2000). 
This change in character of the violence has been described as a ‘democratization of 
violence’ (Koonings and Kruijt 1999).!
One thing that also changed throughout the 1990s was the military’s involvement in civil 
and political affairs (at least officially). In Honduras the police and military went through 
various reforms. In 1993 criminal investigation was transferred from the military to a newly 
formed Public Ministry (Ministeria Publica), in 1996 a constitutional reform transferred 
public security authority out of the armed forces and in 1998 the new Organic Law of the 
National Police (Ley Orgánica de la Polícia Ncional - LOPN) formed a new civilian police 
force instead of the former Public Security Force (Fuerza de Seguridad Pública) (Ungar 
and Salomón: 30). !
Important parts of these efforts to decrease the military involvement in civil affairs were 
though rolled back under the government of Ricardo Maduro (2002-2006), who expanded 
the police forces markedly and allowed more searches without a warrant. Furthermore the 
military was reintroduced into regular policing, as part of the “war on gangs” (Ibid). !
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Zelaya officially opposed the line of reintroducing the military in civil affairs and won the 
2006 elections on his slogan of “Poder Ciudadana” (Citizen power). As explained in the 
introduction however Zelaya was removed by the military, and after the coup the military 
has reoccupied tasks in areas, that they were dismissed from by the reforms in the 1990s 
(Yoder et al:  46). !
!
As described above Honduras has a history of military involvement in civil and political 
affairs, through military coups, dictatorships and military involvement in public security. 
Since the 1990s though Honduras has been ruled by electoral democracy, and officially 
the military has not been in charge of political matters since the last dictatorship ended in 
1982. I will therefore argue that the coup d’etat represents what Buzan and Wæver 
describes as a breaking of the rules of normal politics, since it breaks with the rule of 
electoral democracy and reintroduces military involvement in political issues, that has not 
been seen in Honduras since 1982. One might then argue that it is a breaking of the 
existing rules of normal politics, and a reintroduction of previous rules of politics. 
Nevertheless I find it important that it breaks with what could be defined as the current 
rules of normal politics. !
However securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking the rules of normal politics. It has to 
be a securitizing speech act that leads to the breaking of rules in order for it to be a 
securitization (Buzan and Wæver: 25).!
In the following chapter I will investigate which speech acts leed up to the coup against 
Zelaya and if these speech acts can be defined as securitizing.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 5: Securitization of President Zelaya !!
5.1: Securitizing actors speaking against Zelaya and the fourth ballot!
According to the report made by the truth and reconciliation commission, various actors 
within Honduran society had participated in legitimizing the Coup before it took place. Thus 
the commission mentions six important institutional and sociopolitical actors, that were part 
of the conflict resulting in the coup against Zelaya: The armed forces, the secretary of 
security and police, the political parties, the medias, and the churches (Catholic and 
protestant) (Barillas et al: 14). !
To further investigate more specifically who argued against Zelaya and which argument 
they used I will here analyze the article published in La Prensa the 27th of june 2009 (the 
day before the coup) Like in the truth and reconciliation commissions report, the article 
describes various actors involved in the conflict regarding the fourth ballot. Analyzing the 
arguments described in this article I find that some of them follow the structure of a 
securitizing speech act, as Buzan and Wæver describes it, while others can not be 
described as securitizing speech acts, but maybe as politicizing. I will here analyze the 
securitizing speech acts in order to identify securitizing actors, referent objects and the 
claimed existential threat. !
5.1.1: The political parties and members of congress 
One of the main critics of Zelaya and the fourth ballot was the president of the congress, 
Roberto Michelletti, from Zelaya’s own liberal party. Since march 2009 he argued against 
the ballot, claiming it unconstitutional and criminal, and warning that Zelaya’s real intention 
was to make it possible to be reelected, and thereby stay in power. Thus he claimed that 
the fourth ballot had to be stopped in defense of the Honduran democracy, and he called 
for the military not to “lend themselves" to a president who just wanted to stay in power. 
Likewise the president of the conservative party and mayor of the capital, Tegucigalpa, 
Ricardo Álvarez, directed his arguments at the armed forces: “Do not lend yourselves for 
Zelaya’s game. Stay respectful and obedient to the law. You owe more loyalty to the 
constitution than to the president” (Mendez: 2009). !
Micheletti and Álvarez can be seen as representing different organizations. The author of 
the article emphasizes Micheletti’s status as president of the congress, and not his status 
as member of the liberal party. Thus as securitizing actor Micheletti can be seen as 
primarily representing the congress, but also the opposition in Zelayas own party. Álvarez 
was president of the national party, and I therefore interpret him as a securitizing actor 
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representing the national party. Thus they can both be seen as representing the political 
opposition to Zelaya, within both the national party and the liberal party. !
The general argument in both Micheletti's and Álvarez’ speech acts is that the forth ballot 
is unconstitutional and criminal, and that Zelaya’s real aim is to stay in power, which will 
threaten the democracy of Honduras. Thus their argument follows the plot of an existential 
threat, which is that Zelaya will stay in power. The referent object is the democracy and the 
constitution, and the suggested way out is to stop the fourth ballot from taking place. What 
further makes me characterize their speech acts as securitizing moves is that they both 
direct their speech at the armed forces. By directing their argument at the military, the 
institution that is supposed to take care of security issues, I interpret that they are trying to 
move the issue out of normal politics and into the security sphere - more concretely out of 
the hands of the congress and into the hands of the military.!
Micheletti’s and Álvarez’ statements were announced already in march and april, two 
months before a majority in congress disapproved the conduct of the executive, which 
shows that they were calling for the military to act before they had used the remedies 
available for the congress, thereby trying to push the issue into the field of security.!
!
5.1.2: Representatives of juridicial institutions!
Besides from members of the congress other important societal actors took part in the 
conflict. Already in march 2009 the attorney for defense of the constitution (La Fiscalía de 
Defensa de la Constitución), René Adán Tomé, stated that it is unconstitutional to ask the 
people through a fourth ballot if you can reform paragraphs in the constitution or make a 
constitutional assembly.!
In may members of the constitutional assembly from 1982 send out a statement specifying 
that parts of the constitution could not be changed by a fourth ballot nor by a referendum, 
and that if the president made a constitutional assembly he was looking for a coup. !
Likewise in may the supreme electoral court (Corta Suprema Electoral - CSE) ordered the 
media to stop sending electoral publicities made by the executive about the fourth ballot, 
arguing that it was confusing and misinforming the people.!
In june the court of administrative disputes (Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo) 
ordered the secretary of security and the chief of the joint forces to abstain from 
participating in the referendum because it was considered illegal. !
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After this the president of the supreme court of justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia - CSJ), 
Jorge Rivera Avilez, announced that the judgement of the court of administrative disputes 
should be respected (Mendez: 2009). !
The actors mentioned here are all somehow related to the juridicial system; three of them 
represent courts, while the members of the constitutional assembly from 1982 and the 
attorney for defense of the constitution can be seen as guards of the constitution it self. 
The actors speaking in these cases can thus be seen as representing the juridicial power 
of the state. !
Their statements follow the argument of the fourth ballot being unconstitutional and illegal. 
The arguments do not explicitly follow the rhetorics of securitization though. They do not 
mention existential threats, but illegalities, which would normally be handled by the means 
available within juridicial institutions. However I do interpret parts of these speech acts as 
securitizing moves, since they, like the ones analyzed above, call for the armed forces to 
take action, or not to follow the orders of the president, which would be the normal rules of 
politics. I interpret that, by calling for the armed forces to take action, they try to push the 
issue out of the hands of the juridicial system and into the field of security. !
The referent object in this case is the constitution and the rule of law.!
!
5.2: Internal facilitating conditions !
As mentioned above it differs a bit from the different actors to which extend their speech 
act follows the grammar of securitization, with the plot of an existential threat, a point of no 
return and a suggested way out. !
The speech acts that most strictly follow this grammar is the ones performed by the 
opponents in the political parties. !
Thus the speech acts of Micheletti and Álvarez follows the grammar by pointing at Zelaya 
staying in power as the existential threat. The point of no return is the fourth ballot/ 
referendum, and therefore the suggested way out is to stop this from taking place.  !
The speech acts performed by representatives from the different juridicial institutions do 
not follow the grammar of securitization explicitly. They don’t explicitly claim the fourth 
ballot an existential threat, but an illegality. They do though all point at the fourth ballot as a 
critical event, and they do point at a suggested way out - that the armed forces should stop 
the fourth ballot from taking place.!
As internal facilitating condition thus I find that the arguments expressed by one category 
of securitizing actors follows the grammar of securitization, while the arguments performed 
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by the other category of securitizing actors, do not strictly follow this grammar, but do have 
securitizing elements, since their suggested way out is that the armed forces take action.!
!
5.3: External facilitating conditions!
5.3.1: The nature of the alleged threat 
The claimed threat is that Zelaya’s real intention is to change the constitution so that he 
can stay in power. The threat of this is, that Zelaya will turn Honduras into a dictatorship, or 
that he will change the democratic structures, so that he as president get’s more 
prerogatives and the congress gets less. !
According to Buzan and Wæver it is not analytically possible to define whether a threat is 
real or not. It is not possible to say whether or not Zelaya’s real intention was to stay in 
power and if this would have happened if the fourth ballot had taken place. Some 
circumstances related to the character of the threat do though have some relevance 
regarding the likelihood of the audience accepting this threat as real.!
The first circumstance that I find relevant is the political history of Honduras, that has been 
affected by long periods of dictatorship (Gordon and Webber: 22). I find that the likelihood 
of people accepting it as an existential threat that Zelaya will stay in power is strengthened 
by the consciousness of former dictatorships.!
Another circumstance is the political development in the surrounding region, where 
leftwing leaders such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia has 
managed to reform central parts of the constitutions, but hereby also managed to stay in 
power (Main: 12). This political reality might have affected the audience’s likelihood of 
accepting the securitizing moves. This political context of leftwing leaders staying in power 
in other Latin American countries was also used as illustrating examples by the securitizing 
actors (see for instance Mendez 2009).!
5.3.2: Social power positions held by the securitizing actors!
The securitizing actors identified above all represent institutions of the state. As such they 
all represent some kind of authority towards the people. !
The representatives of the political parties and the congress represent a political power, 
that ideally obtain it’s legitimacy through the votes of the people. !
The representatives of the juridical system on the other hand should ideally be politically 
autonomous and thus not make their judgements on behalf of political opinions, but only in 
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accordance with the law. Thus regarding the constitution, which is as shown above the 
referent object for the securitizing moves, the juridical institutions hold an even stronger 
power position than the representatives of the political parties, and their speech acts has 
therefore at first glance a heavier weight than those of the representatives of political 
parties. Taking a further look at the relationship between the political parties and the 
juridical system in Honduras, the picture though becomes more blurred. !
The truth and reconciliation commission suggests in their report that one of the conditions 
that led to the escalation of the crisis between the legislative and executive power in 
Honduras, was the lack of autonomy and independence of the political institutions. Thus 
members of the majority of the juridical institutions in Honduras are nominated by the 
congress. This goes for the 15 members of the supreme court of justice (CSJ), the chief 
prosecutors in the public ministry, the National Commissioner for Human rights, the 
Supreme Court of Auditors, as well as the Supreme Electoral Court (CSE). As one 
interviewee states to the commission regarding the Supreme Electoral Court: “The 
congress is primarily constituted by the traditional parties. So what they do is to install a 
representative of PN, one of PL and one of DC, not whoever, but people who are very 
recognized within the parties, who have been candidates or elected.” (Barillas et al: 212)!
Another interviewee states about the Supreme Court: “Ask whoever in this country and 
they will say: It is constituted by seven members of one party and eight members of the 
other (…) what they do is to define a distribution; so many for this party and so many for 
the other.” (Ibid: 213)!
According to the commission what made the conflict escalate into a political breakdown, 
resulting in a coup, was Zelaya’s distancing from the leading political line within his own 
party and the congress in general. By opposing the leading political line within the 
traditional parties, Zelaya thus opposed not only the leading line within the legislative 
power, but also within the juridical power, since the chiefs within this system to a large 
extend are connected to the traditional parties, as showed above. Thus Zelaya had two 
major authorities within the state against him, the juridical system who announced his 
fourth ballot illegal and the legislative who ended up blocking the fourth ballot in congress. 
Zelaya though continued with his project arguing that he had the people in his back, and 
ordering the military to assist the referendum (Ibid: 205).!
The military was then left between two important powers of the state: The congress and 
the juridical system on the one side claiming the action of the fourth ballot illegal, and the 
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president on the other side, from whom the military, according to the article 277 of the 
Honduran constitution, are required to follow orders (Ibid: 187). !
What in the end made the military follow the orders from the supreme court is difficult to 
say. The truth and reconciliation commissions report suggests that some personal bonds 
between Zelaya and General Vásquez were broken in the days leading up to the coup. But 
another factor that might have had importance is the lack of autonomy of the juridical 
institutions which illustrate the power position the traditional parties hold in Honduras.!
Another circumstance that strengthened the position of the securitizing actors, was (and is) 
the role of the biggest Honduran media concerns, which in their majority privileged the 
oppositions arguments of the fourth ballot being illegal. According to the commissions 
report the major Honduran medias are all owned by six families from the economic elite 
(Ibid: 216).!
!
5.4: Interim conclusion!
Through the analysis of the securitization of President Zelaya I have found two major 
securitizing actors: representatives of the traditional political parties and representatives of 
the juridical system.!
The arguments used by both of the securitizing actors states that Zelaya’s wish of a fourth 
ballot is illegal and unconstitutional. !
I find that the speech acts performed by represenativets of the political parties follow the 
grammar of securitization as described by Buzan and Wæver. Thus the claimed existential 
threat is that Zelaya will stay in power. This is claimed a threat to democracy and the 
constitution, which then constitutes the referent object. The point of no return is claimed to 
be the fourth ballot or the referendum, which according to the securitizing speech acts will 
be used by Zelaya to prolong his mandate. The suggested way out is that the military 
stops the fourth ballot from taking place.!
The speech acts performed by representatives of the juridical institutions do not follow the 
grammar of securitization to the same extend. They do not claim Zelaya’s or his wish of a 
fourth ballot an existential threat, but they claim the fourth ballot illegal and 
unconstitutional. I do find that these speech acts has elements of securitizing moves, since 
their suggested solution is to let the military take action, the institution that is normally in 
charge of security issues. !
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Thus I find it an internal facilitating condition that might be part of the explanation of the 
success of the securitization of Zelaya, that the speech acts performed by the 
representatives of political parties follow the grammar of securitization.!
Of external facilitating conditions, that might have facilitated the success of the 
securitization, I find the lack of autonomy in the Honduran juridical system, which might 
have strengthened the power position of the securitizing actors. The securitizing speech 
acts gain more weight and authority when expressed by the juridical institutions, than if 
they were only expressed by representatives of the political parties. Another important 
external facilitating condition is the role of the Honduran medias, who generally favoured 
the positions of the securitizing actors. !
A last external facilitating condition that might have helped the securitizing moves gain 
acceptance I find to be the nature of the alleged threat - the threat of a (populist/leftwing) 
president succeeding in prolonging their mandate by changing parts of the constitution. I 
find it a facilitating condition that similar scenarios has actually taken place in other Latin 
American countries within the past two decades, such as Venezuela and Bolivia, where 
Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales has succeeded in staying in power by changing important 
elements of the constitution. I find these external factors facilitating for the securitizing 
actors, since they can refer to these cases to make their claimed threat seem more 
realistic. !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 6: Success of the securitization? - Reactions of 
audiences!
In the previous chapter I investigated how president Zelaya and his fourth ballot project 
was attempted securitized by the securitizing actors representing political parties and the 
juridical institutions in Honduras. In this chapter I will investigate to what extend these 
securitizing moves were successful in gaining acceptance by different groups of 
audiences.!
I will start by identifying some groups of audiences who's acceptance I find of importance 
for the success of the securitization. !
!
6.1: Important groups of audiences!
The audience that I find had the greatest importance for whether or not the breaking of the 
rules of normal politics could take place, is the armed forces of Honduras. The armed 
forces, or the military, was the institution who was called to act by the securitizing actors, 
and the institution that ended up conducting the coup against Zelaya. Thus it is easy to 
conclude that this group of audience accepted the securitizing moves, and enabled the 
breaking of rules to take place. !
In a democracy though, in order to hold legitimacy, the people is another important 
audience that needs to accept the securitizing move and the following breaking of rules. 
The acceptance of the people can be seen as necessary both from a normative 
perspective; following the norms of democracy the will of the people should be the 
foundation of political power. But the acceptance of the people can also be seen as 
important from a more pragmatic perspective; it is necessary in order to avoid revolt and 
resistance from the people, which could lead to an escalation of the conflict, resulting in 
violence. !
In a globalized world I find another audience important, namely the “International Society”. 
The acceptance or nonacceptance of the international society might influence the 
possibilities of the securitizing actors of breaking the rules of normal politics, and 
furthermore it might affect the legitimacy of these breaking of rules.!
I will here investigate to what extent the Honduran people and actors of the international 
society accepted the securitizing moves.!
!
!
!!
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6.2: Reactions of the Honduran people!
The Honduran people has obviously been split in regards to Zelaya and the coup both 
before, during and after the coup, and the divide between “golpistas” and “antigolpistas” 
continue to be significant even today, six years after the event. !
The day after the coup a protest movement emerged, the National Front of Popular 
Resistance (El Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular - FNRP), and soon after a new 
movement emerged supporting the coup, the Civic Democratic Union (La Unión Cívica 
Democrática - UCD). !
In the seven months following the coup there were registered 747 demonstrations directly 
related to the events the 28th of june 2009. The majority of these were against the coup 
and in solidarity with the ex-president, Zelaya, and these demonstrations and 
manifestations formed what since then has been known as La Resistencia (The 
Resistance). The demonstrations and the following conflicts was a constant situation in 
this period, but especially two periods was characterized by intensity in these activities: the 
weeks following the coup and the weeks following the 21st of september, when Zelaya 
returned to the country and stayed under the protection of the Brazilian embassy (Barillas 
et al: 211). !
The emergence of these movements shows that at least parts of the Honduran people did 
not accept the securitizing moves performed by the legislative and juridical powers, and in 
the end the military. They did not accept to let the issue move into the field of security, and 
thereby out of the political sphere, as a subject for political discussion. By demonstrating 
against the coup, the resistance movement insisted on handling the issue as one of 
political character, rather than a security issue, and therefore using the remedies within the 
rules of normal politics, protests and demonstrations being one of them. With Buzan and 
Wævers words the Resistance movement tried to desecuritize or (re-)politicize the issue.   !
!
6.3: Reactions of the international society!
The reactions from the international audience were at first glance very united in their 
condemnation of what they considered a coup d’etat against Zelaya.!
Most countries’ governments condemned the event through declarations and furthermore 
retracted their consultants and ambassadors. (Some important exceptions of the latter 
were though USA, Japan, Taiwan and South Corea who's representatives stayed in the 
country, as well as diplomatic representatives from OAS) (Ibid: 244). !
Likewise a row of multilateral organizations were fast in their condemnation, starting with 
the EU, OAS and SICA, followed by ALBA, MERCOSUR, The Group of RIO, UNASUR, 
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UN, G-16 and many more. The rapidity of the condemnations was unusual, which can be 
seen as a result of different factors. One factor was that many international journalists 
were in the country to cover the fourth ballot and therefore could report rapidly to their 
home country. Another factor was that the event coincided with an international meeting of 
presidents of SICA and the EU in the neighboring country Nicaragua. This latter 
coincidence also made it possible for other bilateral organizations to meet extraordinarily 
immediately after the expulsion of Zelaya, which was the case with OAS and ALBA 
(Barillas et al: 246).  !
As the case occurred in the American continent the OAS became a significant international 
actor in the conflict. The 30th of june OAS had an extraordinary general assembly, where 
they again condemned the coup and declared not to recognize any government following 
as a result of the coup. They furthermore put up an ultimatum stating that if President 
Zelaya was not reinstalled within 72 hours the general assembly of OAS would use the 
article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter to suspend Honduras from the OAS. 
Following this the general secretary of OAS, José Miguel Insulza, traveled to Honduras to 
take diplomatic initiatives during the following 72 hours. But these did not result in the 
reinstatement of Zelaya, and as a response Honduras was suspended from OAS the 4th 
of july 2009, and leaders and diplomats from the member countries were prohibited to 
have any diplomatic contact with the government of Micheletti (Ibid: 245). !
Besides from these diplomatic sanctions a variety of countries imposed economic and 
comercial sanctions. After June 28, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration 
(CABEI) suspended all loans and disbursements to Honduras. In addition, the CA-4 
(Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras) announced the suspension of all 
trade with Honduras. The European Union announced a pause in their budget support to 
the Honduran government with a value of 65.5 million euros. The World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank froze loans with a combined value of approximately $ 
200 million. According to the government of President Lobo that followed after Micheletti’s 
de facto government, the sanctions affecting the country with almost two billion dollars 
(Ibid: 257).!
Besides from condemning declarations and sanctions some countries directly supported 
Zelaya, for instance by receiving and accommodating him and his diplomats, which was 
the case for Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Venezuela furthermore 
supported Zelaya directly by borrowing him an airplane (Ibid: 244).!
!
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Regardless of these immediate condemnations and sanctions from the international 
society, the common aim of reinstalling democratic order as before the coup, here under 
reinstalling Zelaya as president, did not succeed, and Micheletti’s de facto government 
ended up staying in power until the following elections the 29th of november. !
Representatives of the international society tried to facilitate negotiations between 
Micheletti and Zelaya, where the reinstatement of Zelaya before the elections in november 
was one of the major requirements from the international society. Thus the elections in 
november became an important point in the negotiations, and great parts of the 
international actors threatened with not recognizing the elections, if Zelaya had not been 
reinstalled before. But Micheletti and his de facto government ended up not listening to 
this (Ibid: 258).!
!
There can be various explanations for this. The commission suggests that the rapid 
exclusion of Honduras from the OAS, and the diplomatic isolation of the Micheletti 
government just after the coup, might have weakened the bargaining position of the 
international society, using their means of sanctions before trying to negotiate (Ibid: 247). !
Another factor might have been the role of the USA. Although the official position of the 
Obama government was in line with the rest of the international society in their 
condemnation of the coup and requirement of the reinstatement of Zelaya, some importing 
actors in the top of US politics supported Micheletti and his government. Despite of the 
guidelines from the Obama government about diplomatic isolation of the Micheletti 
government, delegations of Micheletti sympathizers visited the US in various occasions, as 
well as north american politicians visited Honduras and the Micheletti government. Thus a 
delegation of republican congress members visited Honduras from the 25th to the 26th of 
july 2009, and afterwards 17 republican senators sent a letter to the foreign ministry of the 
US demanding the US government to change its position regarding the crisis in Honduras. 
Few days after 20 US congress members signed the resolution 619 condemning Zelaya’s 
attempt to change the Honduran constitution. !
The Obama government did not change it’s position towards Honduras on behalf of this, 
but the existence of support by US congress members might never the less have 
strengthened Micheletti’s position (Ibid: 252). !
Another factor that might have influenced the outcome of the crisis was the statements of 
the US diplomat, Thomas Shannon, who had been one of the principal drivers of the 
negotiation process. Few days before the agreement was to be consolidated he expressed 
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in an interview to the CNN in spanish, that the US could recognize the elections, even 
though Zelaya had not been reinstalled (Ibid: 258). With this statement he undermined the 
primary sanction that the international society had used as threat in the negotiations with 
Micheletti, and following his statement a critical amount of countries ended up recognizing 
the elections even though Zelaya was not reinstalled before. Thus USA, Costa Rica, 
Panamá, Guatemala and Perú recognized the elections, while the EU took a more neutral 
position, not recognizing the elections, but on the other hand not condemning them either. 
Oppositely Brazil took the lead of organizing a group of Latin American countries, that did 
not recognize the elections, including Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay 
and Venezuela (Ibid: 259). !
!
6.4: Interim conclusion!
The Honduran people were split between those who supported the coup and those who 
did not. Just after the coup a new movement emerged protesting against the removal of 
Zelaya and the de facto government of Micheletti. This movement did not accept the 
securitization of Zelaya, and with their numerous protest marches and demonstrations they 
tried to re-politicize and desecuritize the issue. The protesters were though treated as a 
threat or enemy by the authorities, and were thus met by the means of security politics, 
showing a lack of will and/or capacity of the political leaders to handle the issue with the 
means available within the normal rules of politics. !
The general approach from the formal international society was at first glance to condemn 
the coup and thereby not to accept the securitization of Zelaya. Nevertheless the end 
result of the long process from 28th of june to 29th of november was that a critical amount 
of countries ended up accepting the elections and thereby giving the coup government, 
and not least the Lobo government which followed the elections, some kind of legitimacy. 
Intentionally or not major parts of international society thus ended up partly accepting the 
securitization of Zelaya or at least the breaking of the rules of normal politics - the coup, 
the Michiletti government and the government following the november 2009 elections.!
On behalf of these findings I will conclude that the securitization of Zelaya was partly 
successful in so far as it gained partly acceptance by important parts of international 
society and it succeeded in implementing the extraordinary measure of removing a 
democratically elected president. !
!
!
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Chapter 7: Interconnectedness to other securitizations!
In the previous chapters I have investigated how Zelaya was sought securitized and to 
which extend the securitizing actors succeeded in this. In this chapter I will investigate as 
Buzan and Wæver suggests how the securitization of Zelaya impinged on the security of 
others and how it is interconnected to other securitized issues in Honduras. !
!
7.1: Securitization of FNRP and La Resistencia!
As described above a large part of the Honduran population did not accept the securitizing 
moves aimed at legitimizing the coup against Zelaya. Instead they tried to desecuritize the 
issue by protesting. !
I will argue though that the protests were met with the means of security politics. Thus the 
demonstrations of La Resistencia were met by units from both the police, the military and 
special units trained to combat enemies. On the other hand the demonstrations of the 
UCD were protected by the normal police force (Policía Preventiva) (Barillas et al: 211). !
Using these special units in the confrontations with the protesters of La Resistencia, I will 
argue, is to treat the demonstrators as an enemy and threat, and not as political 
opponents. The demonstrations of La Resistencia escalated to violent conflicts between 
armed forces (police and military) and demonstrators in many occasions, which according 
to the truth and reconciliation commission was a result of the political leaders’ lacking 
capacity and/or will to handle the issue with the means of normal politics:!
“The political class left them (the police) struggling with a conflict, which possibility of 
solution consisted of institutional and political reforms” (Ibid: 211). !
FNRP and La Recistencia were furthermore subject to a large amount of human rights 
abuses, such as assassinations, torture and arbitrary arrests, for which especially the 
police has been claimed responsible (Gordon and Webber: 45). !
Founded on the reactions from the state (the political leaders and the armed forces) I will 
argue that the securitization of Zelaya spread to the supporters of Zelaya, so that 
extraordinary measures were used also in the confrontations with these. I will thus argue 
that the securitization of Zelayas impinged negatively on the security of the people of 
Honduras, especially those who joined the FNRP and La Resistencia. !
!
!
!!!
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7.2: Gangs, criminality and violence!
In order to investigate how the securitization of Zelaya was interconnected with other 
securitizations, I have tried to identify which other issues are securitized in Honduras. The 
first area that catches your attention as securitized is the interconnected issues of gangs, 
criminality, narco traffics and violence. !
La Violencia  (The violence) is an issue that from the middle of the 1990s and onwards has 
won a place as the major problem in central american media and politics. In the media it 
can be seen by daily coverage of murders, attacks and kidnappings and in the political 
sphere the subject has been a major issue for electoral campaigns since the mid 1990’s 
where shifting political candidates has run campaigns on slogans such as “Mano 
Dura” (hard hand) and “Cero Tolerancia” (zero tolerance). Thus the nationalist president 
Ricardo Maduro, who was in power from 2002 to 2006, won the 2001 elections on his 
rhetorics about zero tolerance against ‘La Violencia’, criminality and the gangs. Likewise in 
the 2005 elections the nationalist party’s campaign was directed against ‘La violencia’ and 
the gangs, promising to fight violence and criminality with a hard hand (Mano Dura), 
consisting of among other things death penalty for violence perpetrators. !
The political strategies following the ‘mano dura’ and ‘cero tolerancia’ discourses has to a 
large extent consisted of increasing police forces, putting military forces on the streets and 
giving larger prerogatives for investigating, detaining and judging suspected criminals 
(Flores et al: 8-9).!
These strategies has been largely criticized by various human rights organizations, 
because they have reintroduced military control in civil affairs and been used to justify 
social cleansing of youth, who were described by the authorities as criminals and gang 
members (Samayoa et al: 216). !
I will argue that the ‘mano dura’ discourse has been used in Honduras and Central 
America to securitize the problem of gangs, criminality and violence, and thereby justifying 
the (re-)engagement of the military in civil affairs and the extrajudicial killings of young 
people. !
I see this securitization as interconnected with the securitization of Zelaya and his 
supporters in several ways. !
The first way is, that the reintroduction of the military in civil affairs, which was legitimized 
by Maduro with reference to the gangs, criminality and violence in the country, might have 
been one factor that helped the coup come about. Public spendings on the armed forces 
increased under the rule of Maduro, and the military got a more central place in the 
political sphere again. Zelaya on the other hand won the 2005 elections on the slogan of 
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‘Poder Ciudadana’ (citizen power) focused on enhancing civil rights and democratic 
influence. With this he opposed the ‘mano dura’ discourse, and thereby the policies of 
giving more prerogatives and funds to the military. I will argue that this might have been a 
factor that helped to convince the military to remove Zelaya, since his policies did not 
serve the interests of the military.!
Besides from this I find the securitization of the issue related to gangs, criminality and 
violence interconnected to the large amount of human rights abuses that were committed 
against the members of La Resistencia and FNRP. I will argue that the country had already 
been partly militarized as part of Maduros politics, and had already been used for social 
cleansing of what was defined as criminals and gang members. I find that the already 
widespread militarization of the country has helped both the coup it self and the following 
human rights abuses against FNRP and La Resistencia to come about. !
!
7.3: Interim conclusion!
I have here argued that the supporters of Zelaya, specifically members of FNRP and La 
Resistencia, has been treated by the state as a threat or enemy, and therefore been met 
with the means available within security politics, namely the use of force by the military 
and police. I have further argued that this treatment of the supporters of Zelaya can be 
seen as a sign, that the securitization of Zelaya has spread to also concern his supporters. 
The securitization of Zelaya has thus impinged negatively on the security of the members 
of FNRP and La Resistencia, since they have been subject to a large amount of human 
rights abuses, such as murders, threats and arbitrary detentions.!
I have further argued that this securitization of members of FNRP and La Resistencia and 
the following human rights abuses committed against them is interconnected to another 
successful securitization in Honduras, namely that concerning gangs, criminality and 
violence. I have argued that this latter securitization has led to a (re-) militarization of the 
country, which I will argue have helped both the coup against Zelaya and the human rights 
violations against his supporters come about. !
!
!
!
!!
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Chapter 8: Discussion: How can the securitization theory help explain 
the Coup in Honduras and what are the shortcomings of the theory in 
explaining this? !!
Through my analysis I have investigated the applicability of the securitization theory on the 
case of the coup d’etat in Honduras in 2009.!
I find that the securitization theory is applicable on the case of the coup d’etat in Honduras, 
in so far that it has been possible to identify securitizing actors performing speech acts that 
follow what Buzan and Wæver define as the grammar of securitizing rhetorics. !
By identifying the actors and speech acts as suggested by Buzan and Wæver I find that it 
was possible to identify some important dynamics, that might serve as part of an 
explanation for how the coup could come about. It has served to identify who were the 
important actors, and how these actors sought to legitimize the removal of Zelaya. !
The framework further intents to include contextual aspects, that might have helped the 
securitizing moves gain acceptance - the so called facilitating conditions.!
I find that these categories are helpful in pointing at important areas for investigation, 
especially the power relations between securitizing actors and audiences, as well as the 
special characteristics of the alleged threat that might help the securitizing move gain 
acceptance. !
While I find the analytical tools for analyzing the speech act it self rather specific and 
useful for understanding this part of the securitization process, I find that the theoretical 
and analytical tools for analyzing the contextual aspects are rather underspecified. !
I find that especially the role of the audience and not least the power position of specific 
audiences is underspecified. For instance it would have been relevant to ask: Why did the 
acceptance of some groups of audiences seem to meen more than the acceptance of 
other groups, in order to enable the breaking of rules? More specifically, why did the 
statement of a North American diplomat come to meen so much? Why did diplomatic 
contact between the Micheletti government and representatives of the Republican Party in 
the USA seem to meen so much? Why did the lack of acceptance of the Honduran people 
and the official representatives of the international society seem to meen so little for the 
Micheletti government? !
!
Suggestions for that could be historical and economic circumstances, such as the tight 
economic bonds that has existed between Honduras and USA since the early beginning of 
Honduras’ industrial development, and which still exists today - US is still the major trade 
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partner. A further analysis of these circumstances would though require some tools, that 
the securitization theory does not offer in it self, and it could therefor have been relevant to 
use other theoretical and analytical perspectives, for instance a more critical realistic view. 
Gordon and Webber (2013) for instance offers a historical-materialist analysis of the coup 
in Honduras, which could advantageously have been used as empirical background for 
such an analysis. !
!
Other analysts has criticized the securitization theory for being underspecified in important 
aspects and for lacking analytical tools for investigating the construction of security. One 
such critique has been stated by McDonald (2008), who claim that the securitization 
framework is to narrow in several aspects.!
First he criticizes the narrow focus on language and speech acts because it excludes other 
important forms of communication and practices, that might be of importance in relation to 
the construction of security issues. These other forms of communication and practices 
could for instance be images or “(…)forms of bureaucratic practices or physical action that 
do not merely follow from securitizing ‘speech acts’ but are part of the process through 
which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed.” (McDonald: 
569) !
He further criticizes the narrow focus on a specific moment in which something becomes a 
security issue, and argues that security can be constructed over longer periods of time, 
than the securitization framework allows us to see (Ibid: 576).!
With this critique in mind it might have been relevant (as argued above) to focus more on 
historical factors in relation to the coup in Honduras. Did the securitization of a lefties/
reformist president really come about during half a year with securitizing speech acts 
against his fourth ballot project? Or did this securitization draw on the past securitization 
and militant suppression of everyone who could be defined as lefties? The securitization 
framework suggests to investigate how distinct securitizations are interconnected, but 
does not give any specific advise or theoretical tools for this investigation. !
!
McDonald further criticizes the framework from a normative perspective, claiming that the 
securitization framework’s narrow focus on speech acts, capable of leading to the use of 
extraordinary measures, privileges a focus on political leaders, since they are more likely 
to be able to put in action the resources of the state. By doing so the framework, according 
to McDonald, neglects marginalized groups’ understandings and experiences of 
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(in)security and their attempts to articulate those. He argues that a framework for security 
analysis should to a larger extend than the securitization theory does, engage in 
investigations of marginalized voices on and articulations of security and insecurity, and 
how some voices become empowered or marginalized to define security and threat (Ibid: 
574).!
Taking this point to the study of the Honduran coup d’etat it could have been relevant to 
investigate more in depth how marginalized groups, such as FNRP and La Resistencia 
experienced threats, security and insecurity in relation to the coup. This would of course 
have changed markedly the subject of the investigation, but as McDonald argues it might 
also have helped make visible alternative discourses on security (Ibid: 582). !
!
Although the securitization framework has the above mentioned shortcomings in 
explaining important factors of why the specific securitization of Zelaya could gain success 
in the specific Honduran context, I do find that the framework is particularly helpful in 
capturing the importance of discursive constructions of security. It might though have been 
helpful to supplement the securitization analysis with other theoretical and analytical 
perspectives, for instance those suggested by McDonald or by Gordon and Webber. !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 35
Chapter 9: Conclusion !
How can the securitization theory help explain the Coup d’etat in Honduras in 2009 and 
what are the shortcomings of the theory in explaining this? !
!
Through this investigation I have sought to explore the applicability of the securitization 
theory on the case of the coup d’etat in Honduras in 2009.!
! I have found that the coup d’etat in 2009 can be seen as a breaking of the rules of 
normal politics that has existed in the country the last two decades. The forceful removal of 
a democratically elected president breaks with the rule of electoral democracy, that has 
formally been the ruling structure since the ending of the last dictatorship in 1982. !
I have found that several societal actors were arguing against Zelaya and his wish of a 
fourth ballot about weather or not to create a constituent assembly. I have found two 
primary categories of actors, who's speech acts I define as securitizing moves. These 
actors are representatives from political parties and the congress, and representatives 
from different juridicial institutions of the state. !
! Of internal facilitating conditions, that might have helped the securitizing moves gain 
acceptance, I find that the speech acts performed by the representatives of political parties 
follow the grammar of securitizing rhetorics. Thus they claim it an existential threat to 
democracy that Zelaya will make constitutional changes, that allow him to stay in power. 
They state the fourth ballot as a point of no return, and therefor the suggested way out of 
the threat, they claim, is to stop the fourth ballot from taking place, with the use of 
extraordinary measures. They direct their speech act at the armed forces of the country 
and ask them not to follow orders from the president. !
The speech acts performed by representatives of the juridical institutions, does not to the 
same extend follow the grammar of securitizing rhetorics. I find though that their 
arguments, has a securitizing character, since they, like the ones performed by the 
representatives of political parties, are directed at the armed forces, asking them to take 
action against the fourth ballot. !
Of external facilitating conditions, that might have facilitated the success of the 
securitization, I find the power position held by the securitizing actors. The securitizing 
actors are both representatives of the state, and as such I find that they hold a powerful 
position. The fact that more than one organ of the state is making securitizing moves, 
further strengthen the position of the securitizing actors. I condition that might have 
influenced this power position is the lack of autonomy between the congress and the 
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juridical institutions in Honduras, which might explain why the juridical institutions backed 
up the securitizing moved performed by representatives of the political parties. !
Other important external facilitating conditions I find to be the Honduran medias, who 
generally favored the arguments performed against Zelaya, and thereby helped the 
securitization come about.!
I have found a last external facilitating condition to be the nature of the alleged threat, and 
it’s relation to the historical and political context. I find that the historical context of past 
experiences of dictatorships in Honduras and Latin America, might have helped the 
alleged threat seem more realistic, and thereby gaining acceptance. Likewise I find the 
current political development in the region of leftwing leaders reforming constitutions and 
thereby obtaining to stay in power longer, an external facilitating condition, that helps to 
make the threat seem more realistic. !
!
In order to investigate weather or not the securitizing moves claiming Zelaya a threat can 
be seen as a successful securitization I have investigated the level of acceptance of 
different groups of audiences. I have found that the securitization was successful in so far 
that it managed to gain acceptance by, what seems like the most important audience, 
namely the military, who ended up carrying out the coup against Zelaya. Thus the 
securitizing moves became a success in so far as it allowed the breaking of the rules of 
normal politics to take place.!
When it comes to gaining legitimacy of this breaking of rules the picture becomes more 
blurred though. Large parts of the Honduran society did not accept the securitizing moves, 
and a new movement emerged protesting against the removal of Zelaya, which I have 
defined as an attempt to desecuritize the issue. !
Likewise the reactions of the formal representatives of international society were at first 
glance to condemn the coup and require the reinstatement of Zelaya, thereby refusing to 
accept the securitizing moves against him.!
Nevertheless the unity in the international society got weakened and a critical amount of 
countries ended up recognizing the November 2009 elections, and thereby giving some 
kind of legitimacy to the Micheletti government and not least the following government of 
President Lobo. !
I therefore find that the securitization was successful in so far that it succeeded in making 
the use of extraordinary measures happen and to some extend in legitimizing the use of 
these.!
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Ultimately I have the securitization of Zelaya to be interconnected to other securitizations 
in Honduras, and to negatively impinge on the security on others, especially those who are 
associated to the FNRP and La Resistencia. Thus I have found that though the resistance 
movement tried to desecuritize the issue of Zelaya and the fourth ballot, by protesting, they 
were met by the state with the means of security politics. I have therefore argued that the 
securitization of Zelaya somehow spread to be a securitization of those supporting his 
political project, and thereby impinging negatively on the security of those. !
I have furthermore found that the securitzation of Zelaya was interconnected to the 
securitization that I have characterized as the “war on gangs”, which led to a 
remilitarization of the country. I argue that this reintroduction of the military into civil affairs, 
such as criminality control, has been a facilitating condition both for the execution of the 
coup against Zelaya and for the treatment of the resistance movement as a threat. !
!
I will argue that the above described findings are all conditions, that help explain how the 
coup in Honduras could come about, and in this respect I find that the securitization theory 
has been a useful analytical tool for investigating the case.!
!
I find though that the theory do not offer sufficient tools to fully investigate some of the 
aspects that it points out as important, her under especially the role of contextual 
conditions and the power position held by the audience. The theory does not offer 
analytical tools to explain why the acceptance of some groups of audiences seemed to be 
of greater importance than the acceptance of other groups of audiences. !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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